Mysterianism
Some philosophers, such as [Chomsky 2009] and [McGinn 1989][McGinn 1999], argue that it is not possible for humans to understand consciousness because we are not equipped to do so. Such positions are called mysterianism, generally by people who don’t like it.
Mysterianism come in two forms, epistemological mysterianism which asserts that while a good physical explanation for consciousness exists, our brains are incapable of comprehending it in the same way that algebra is incomprehensible to an ape. The other form is called ontological mysterianism which asserts that no explanation within the physical realm exists at all and, as such, it is dualistic.
Epistemological Mysterianism
This form believes that there is nothing mysterious about consciousness per se, but that we are unable to comprehend it. The argument, other than mankind’s failure to get anywhere near a solution over thousands of years, is that there can be no bridge between the third person observations of the brain and the first person observations of qualia or phenomenal consciousness. According to this view, no matter how much we get to know about the brain, we will never be able to make the link with why certain states feel in a particular way. In these terms, the view is similar to arguments for an explanatory gap which can never be bridged.
McGinn’s argument has been summarised as follows:.
- Introspection is our only channel to the properties of consciousness, but it does not afford us any access to the properties of the brain.
- Sensory perception is our only channel to the properties of the brain, but it does not afford us any access to the properties of consciousness.
- There is no third channel that affords us access to both consciousness and the brain.
- Therefore, our concept-producing mechanisms cannot in principle produce a concept for the connection between consciousness and the brain. Consequently, our knowledge of consciousness and our knowledge of the brain are doomed to be insulated from one another. More specifically, we can have no knowledge of the manner by which the brain produces or yields consciousness. The connection between the two is necessarily opaque to us. Therefore, we cannot possibly grasp the solution to the problem of consciousness.
McGinn writes :
Neither phenomenological nor physical, this mediating level would not (by definition) be fashioned on the model of either side of the divide, and hence would not find itself unable to reach out to the other side. Its characterization would call for radical conceptual innovation (which I have argued is probably beyond us). Since it would not be characterized by concepts familiar from either side of the psychophysical nexus, however, extended, it would not simply raise the same old problem again in a new form. The operative properties would be neither at the phenomenal surface nor right down there with the physical hardware; they would be genuinely deep and yet they would not simply coincide with physical properties of the brain. Somehow they would make perfect sense of the psychophysical nexus, releasing us from the impasse that seems endemic to the topic. They really would explain how it is that chunks of matter can develop an inner life. (p.102-3)
Ontological Mysterianism
Ontological mysterianism is a dualist version which takes the matter further and asserts that, not only is consciousness incomprehensible to us but that it involves non-physical substances. There appears to be very little literature on the subject.
A description of mysterianism can be found in https://www.edge.org/response-detail/27017