Responsibility under Libertarianism

Responsibility under Libertarianism

Libertarianism asserts that we do have some freedom to choose but that this freedom is limited by external constraints which could be anything from the Law of Gravity to being locked up in prison to having a brain injury.

Libertarianism would therefore draw a distinction between actions for which an agent is responsible and those for which s/he is not.  We react to a person’s action differently depending on whether we believe it was freely chosen and, if it was not, then according to the nature of the constraint or the duress which was applied.

This can be seen when we consider people who, for whatever reason, may be considered to be less culpable because of “diminished responsibility”. They are treated more as automata and less as free agents and the punishment, or the therapy, which is meted out reflects this.

In practice, the main determinant of how an agent is treated is the pragmatic result of reward and punishment and its effect in controlling behaviour regardless of its justice or its fairness. A person’s responsibility for their actions is then likely to be defined by whether, or not, their behaviour can be changed by reward or punishment.

Even if we are not just our brains and bodies, we do rely on these for interacting with the world in a similar way in which a car driver relies on the car for transport. If there is an accident then it could be down to driver error, for which he would be responsible, or mechanical failure of the car, for which he might not.

Likewise, a particular behaviour might be the responsibility of the person if it was chosen and consented to, alternatively it could be due to a brain malfunction or due to having received false information.

How one tells the difference is problematic. It depends on what we believe constitutes the “driver” and what constitutes the “car”.  This has been the subject of many arguments about mitigation by diminished responsibility in courts of law.

When we allow for the existence of some freedom of choice, there is the unknown of where to place the boundary between the person, as an agent, and the external world. For instance, is it our eyes? our optic nerve? The V1 part of the brain, some other part of the brain? Or a separate entity which is connected to the brain in a similar way in which a driver is connected to a car?

Since this is unknown and is the subject of shakily founded beliefs, the way we treat other people tends to be more to do with either producing a desired change in behaviour or to an emotional response to being wronged or blessed by others, regardless of justice or truth.

Without true free will, which is ruled out by physicalism, the concept of justice, as opposed to correction, loses its meaning.